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Abstract—Coded caching schemes on broadcast networks with
user caches help to offload traffic from peak times to off-peak
times by prefetching information from the server to the users
during off-peak times and thus serving the users more efficiently
during peak times using coded transmissions. We consider the
problem of secretive coded caching which was proposed recently,
in which a user should not be able to decode any information
about any file that the user has not demanded. We propose a new
secretive coded caching scheme which has a lower average rate
compared to the existing state-of-the-art scheme, for the same
memory available at the users. The proposed scheme is based on
exploiting the presence of common demands between multiple
users.
I. INTRODUCTION
Caching has historically proved to be a significant aid in
reducing the load in information flow networks, both wired
and wireless. The caching problem consists of two phases,
the placement phase and the delivery phase. In the placement
phase, when the network congestion is less, parts of files from
the server are placed in the caches of the users(clients) based
on statistics about the user demands. During the delivery phase
when the users demand particular files, the network traffic
is more, and the server ensures that the demands are met
using network transmissions with the assistance of the cache.
Caching is now almost ubiquitous in wireline and wireless
networks, and newer variants are promised to accelerate the
performance in latest communication infrastructures (see for
example, [1]).
Recently, in the landmark paper [2], a novel coded caching
scheme was proposed for a network consisting of a single
server containing N files each with F bits connected via a
single noiseless broadcast link to K users. Each user is also
equipped with a cache of size M (which can store MF bits).
Under this scenario, the authors of [2] showed substantial
reduction in the rate, i.e., the load on the shared link compared
to the conventional caching scheme, by transmitting coded
subfiles in the delivery phase. For instance, it was shown
that for N ≥ K , the uncoded conventional caching scheme
achieves a rate of K(1−MN ), while the coded caching scheme
achieves K1+KM/N (1 −
M
N ). It was also shown that the rate
achieved by the scheme of [2] lies within a constant multiple
of the optimal rate for that setup. Further refinements and
extensions to this fundamental problem have been made since
(for instance see [3]–[6]). The idea of exploiting commonality
of demands between the users to minimise the average rate
and the peak rate was presented in [3], where the authors
showed the exact optimality of their scheme for uncoded cache
placement in the original setup of [2].
The problem of secretive coded caching was introduced
in [7]. In secretive coded caching, the cache content and
the transmissions are required to be such that each user can
decode only the requested file by that user, and no information
about other files. The general achievability scheme of [7] first
encodes the files using a secret sharing scheme. Using the
file-shares in the place of subfiles in the scheme of [2], and
with added secret keys in the caching and delivery phase,
the scheme of [7] ensures that information leakage of files
to unintended users does not happen. A lower bound on the
rate based on cut-sets is also derived in [7]. In [8], the authors
consider a cache network where users are connected to the
server via a set of relay nodes and present secretive coded
caching schemes for such networks.
In this work, we consider the problem of secretive coded
caching and give an achievable scheme which has a lower
average rate compared to the previous scheme in [7]. In order
to present our scheme, we first analyse the leakage proper-
ties of a coded caching scheme modified from the general
achievable scheme in [7] by removing the keys from the
transmissions. The reason for analysing this ‘keyless’ scheme
is to understand which transmissions are redundant and can
be removed from the scheme of [7] (thus decreasing the rate),
without compromising on secrecy. Using our analysis, and
based on insights from [3], we then propose a modified scheme
which achieves an average rate better than [7] exploiting the
commonality between the user demands. The savings in the
link utilization in our proposed scheme naturally are greater
when the number of common demands are higher, and in the
worst case of having no common demands at all, our scheme’s
link utilization matches that of [7].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we recall the relevant results for secretive coded caching from
[7]. We also give few definitions required for our purpose and
summarise the main intuition behind this work. In Section III,
we analyse the ‘keyless’ transmission scheme modified from
that of [7], while keeping the same cache content. We derive
the exact properties of the coded transmissions which result
in leakage of file shares to unintended users, and also find the
exact number of such leaked file shares. Using these results,
in Section IV, we propose our secretive coded caching scheme
based on a simple modification of the scheme in [7] and derive
the improvements in average rate.
Notations: For a positive integer n, we denote by [n] the
set {1, ..., n}. For some set B and some b ∈ B, we denote by
B\b the set B\{b}. For some element c, we denote the set
B ∪ {c} as B ∪ c. Throughout the paper we assume that
(
n
m
)
is zero, if m > n.
II. SECRETIVE CODED CACHING
We recall the problem setup and relevant results from [7].
As with [2], the cache network is a single server connected to
the users via a broadcast link, with the parameters N,K,M
denoting the number of files (each of size F bits) at the server,
the number of users, and the cache available at each user. We
denote the files at the server as Wk : k ∈ [N ], which are
assumed to be independent random variables each distributed
uniformly over [2F ]. The cache content at a user k (k ∈ [K]),
denoted by random variable Zk, takes values from [2
MF ]
according to some function of the N files during the cache
placement phase. The user demands dk : k ∈ [K] during the
delivery phase are collected in aK-length vector d. The server
then transmits a message Xd ∈ [2
RdF ] which is a function of
the files and the cache contents. The coded caching scheme is
defined by the quantitiesXd and Zk, k ∈ [K], and the quantity
Rd is called the rate of the coded caching scheme given d.
Following [3], we denote by Ne(d) the number of unique
demands in d. Let U ⊆ [K] denote a set of leaders, such that
|U | = Ne(d) and du1 6= du2 for any distinct u1, u2 ∈ U . We
also give the following definition for use in the present and
forthcoming sections.
Definition 1 (Demand profile and Demand vector). Let A be
a subset of users, demanding m unique demands (m ≤ |A|)
in total. We define the demand profile dp(A) of A as the m-
tuple of integers such that the ith value in the tuple denotes
the number of users demanding the ith most requested file.
We also define the demand vector of A, denoted by d(A), as
the ordered |A|-tuple of demanded files by the users in A. We
say that two demand vectors (of two sets A,A′) are equal
(denoted by d(A) = d(A′)) if they are equal as vectors except
for a permutation. Note that d([K]) = d, the vector containing
all the demands, which we shall refer to simply as the demand
vector.
In [7], the authors define the notion of information leakage
to quantify the amount of information that unintended users
can decode information about files not demanded by it as
follows.
L = max
d∈[N ]K
max
k∈[K]
I(W [N ]\dk ;Xd, Zk),
where I(; ) is mutual information, and W [N ]\dk is the set of
files except for Wdk .
We refer to a placement and delivery scheme such that all
users can recover their demands and L = 0 as a perfectly
secretive coded caching scheme, or simply a secretive coded
caching scheme. Assuming uniform distribution on the vector
d ∈ [N ]K , the average rate of a secretive coded caching
scheme is defined as the expectation Ed(Rd).
The pair (M,Ravg) is said to be secretively achievable
if there exists a average rate Ravg secretive coded caching
scheme. In [7], the authors presented a secretive coded caching
scheme, which we refer to as the SCCkeys scheme throughout
this paper, achieving the below rate.
Rd = R
keys
avg =
{
K(N+M−1)
N+(K+1)(M−1) , for M =
Nt
K−t + 1
1 M = N(K − 1),
(1)
where t ∈ {0, 1, ...,K−2} and Rkeysavg is the average rate of the
scheme. The convex envelope of these memory-rate points for
any general 1 ≤M ≤ N(K−1) is also shown to be achieved
by memory sharing.
We now present briefly the general achievability scheme
from [7] (with rate as in (1)) for M values in the set
M = { NtK−t + 1 : t = 1, ...,K − 2}. We do not present the
achievability scheme forM ∈ {1, N(K−1)} given in [7] as it
is not relevant to this work. The general achievability scheme
given in [7] consists of a secret sharing outer code followed by
a cache placement and delivery phase that follows the coded
caching scheme of [2] closely. We elaborate as follows.
A (
(
K−1
t−1
)
,
(
K
t
)
) secret sharing scheme is first employed to
encode each file Wi. From the file Wi, the secret sharing
scheme generates
(
K
t
)
shares (of size Fs =
F
(Kt )−(
K−1
t−1 )
each)
such that the file Wi can be completely recovered from all
the
(
K
t
)
shares, but no information about Wi is revealed by
accessing any
(
K−1
t−1
)
shares. The shares of Wi are indexed by
the
(
K
t
)
subsets of [K], denoted as {SAi : A ⊆ [K], |A| = t}.
In the placement phase, for any user k and any file Wi, the
share SAi is placed in the cache of k if k ∈ A. In addition
to shares, for each subset A ⊂ [K] such that |A| = t + 1,
an independent and uniformly generated key TA of size Fs
bits is stored in cache at each user k ∈ A. Note that for
any user k, there are
(
K−1
t−1
)
subsets of [K] which are of
size t containing k. The memory occupied by the shares in
the cache of any user is thus N
(
K−1
t−1
)
Fs = F
Nt
K−t . Along
with the keys, we thus get MF = F ( NtK−t + 1), and hence
M = NtK−t+1. During the delivery phase, the transmissions are
as follows. For each (t+1)-sized subset A ⊂ [K], the vector
Y keysA , TA+
∑
x∈A S
A\x
dx
is transmitted. It is easy to check
that the total number of bits transmitted is Rkeysavg F , where
Rkeysavg is as in (1). The decoding at any user k is successful, as
each missing share of a demanded file at k is a summand in a
transmission Y keysA for some (t+1)-sized subset A containing
k. Any leakage of information from the cache is prevented by
the secret sharing scheme, while leakage of information from
the transmissions is prevented by the keys. For the purposes
of this paper, the above presented coded caching scheme of
[7] is referred to as the SCCkeys scheme.
A. Intuition behind this work
In this paper, we present an improved perfectly secretive
coded caching scheme for the same values of M as in (1)
other than {1, N(K − 1)}. Our scheme has a lower average
rate compared to (1). To do this, we exploit the presence
of commonality between demands of different users. It is
easy to notice that in the presence of all the demands being
common, there is no coding required for the transmission. The
entire scheme can simply be bypassed by transmitting the file
which is being demanded as is, with secrecy being trivially
maintained. It is therefore intuitively clear that the presence of
common demands at the users can potentially aid in reducing
the rate for those demands (and thus the average rate too). For
the coded caching problem (without secrecy), this intuition
was formalized in [3].
In [3], it was shown that in the original scheme of [2],
some transmissions are redundant, i.e., they can be obtained as
linear combinations of other transmissions, for some instances
of demand vectors. Thus, such transmissions can be ‘saved’,
i.e., they need not be transmitted and hence lead to reduced
average rate.
The question we raise is - Can we ‘save’ transmissions in the
SCCkeys scheme also? We notice that because of the presence
of a unique key as a summand in each transmission of the
SCCkeys scheme, no transmission of SCCkeys can obtained
from other transmissions. Thus there cannot be any further
reduction in the average rate if we use the SCCkeys scheme
as it is.
On the other hand, consider the minor modification to
SCCKeys. In this modified scheme, which we shall hence-
forth call as the SCCkeyless scheme, the transmissions are
YA =
∑
x∈A S
A\x
dx
for each A ⊆ [K] such that |A| = t+1. In
other words, compared to the SCCkeys transmission scheme,
the keys are not included as summands in the SCCkeyless
scheme. The cache content for the SCCkeyless scheme re-
mains the same as with the SCCkeys scheme. Clearly, except
for using shares in the place of subfiles, this is identical to
the original scheme of [2]. Because of this similarity, as a
direct consequence of Lemma 1 of [3], we have the following
lemma. We leave the details of the proof to the reader.
Lemma 1. Let A be any (t + 1)-sized subset of non-leaders
from [K] and A = {Ai : i = 1, ...,
(
K
t+1
)
−
(
K−Ne(d)
t+1
)
} be the
set of all (t+ 1)-sized subsets of [K] such that Ai ∩ U 6= φ.
Then
YA =
∑
Ai∈A,d(Ai)=d(A)
Ai\A⊆U
YAi
Lemma 1 suggests that the messages YA for any non-
leader (t + 1)-sized subset A need not be transmitted as it
can be recovered from other transmissions, provided there is
no violation of the secrecy constraint in the transmissions of
SCCkeyless (which depends on the demand vector d). How-
ever, the following example shows that SCCkeyless ensures
secrecy for some demand vectors, but results in leakage for
others. Hence it is not a secretive scheme though the scheme
lends itself to rate reduction by exploiting commonality of
demands.
Example 1. Let N = K = 4 and t = 2. Here each file is
encoded into
(
K
t
)
= 6 shares. The number of transmissions
required is
(
K
t+1
)
= 4. Let the vector d = (1, 1, 2, 2). Then the
transmissions of SCCkeyless scheme are
Y123 = S
23
1 + S
13
1 + S
12
2 , Y124 = S
24
1 + S
14
1 + S
12
2
Y134 = S
34
1 + S
14
2 + S
13
2 , Y234 = S
34
1 + S
24
2 + S
23
2
For the sake of simplicity, in all examples in this paper, we
drop the set notation in the subscript of the transmissions (for
instance Y{1,2,3} is written as Y123). It can be easily checked
that there is no leakage at any user. So SCCkeyless performs
as well as the SCCkeys scheme in this case. Now, consider
d = (1, 1, 1, 2). Then the sum of the transmissions in the
SCCkeyless scheme Y124 + Y134 + Y234 = S
12
2 + S
13
2 + S
23
2 .
Hence, users 1, 2, 3 can decode S232 , S
13
2 , S
12
2 respectively.
However, the SCCkeys scheme remains secure for the same
demand vector, with all the above transmissions having the
keys as the extra summand.
In Section IV of this work, a new secretive coded caching
scheme is proposed which can be said to combine the ad-
vantages of the SCCkeys scheme (in ensuring secrecy for
all demand vectors) and the SCCkeyless scheme (in enabling
rate reduction by not transmitting redundant transmissions).
For this purpose, we investigate the leakage properties of
SCCkeyless scheme in Section III.
III. NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR
LEAKAGE OF SHARES IN SCCkeyless SCHEME
In this section, we obtain the precise leakage properties
of the SCCkeyless scheme. These properties will be used in
the description of our new improved secretive coded caching
scheme in Section IV.
For some user k and for a particular choice of demands at
the K users, we use the notation Ek to denote the set of all
users which have the same demand as k. The following lemma
is an observation which will be used to show the main result
in this section.
Lemma 2. Any two distinct transmissions YX1 and YX2 of the
SCCkeyless (for some (t + 1)-sized subsets X1, X2 of [K])
scheme have at most one summand share in common, i.e., at
most one share is eliminated in the sum YX1 + YX2 .
Proof: There is nothing to prove if there is no common
share. Suppose there is a share common between YX1 and
YX2 . Then there must be some x1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2 such that
x1 6= x2 but S
X1\x1
dx1
= S
X2\x2
dx2
. This means X1\x1 = X2\x2.
However this means that for any other x′1 6= x1 such that
x′1 ∈ X1, we have X1\x
′
1 6⊂ X2. This concludes the proof.
Before we give the main result in this section, we define
the notion of a leaked share of a given coded caching scheme
over a secret sharing scheme as an outer code.
Definition 2 (Leaked shares). Let S be a coded caching
scheme where the cache and transmissions are functions of
the shares (from the secret sharing scheme) and keys, and Xd
be the set of transmissions of S for a particular choice of user
demands d. For some t-sized subset X ′, a share SX
′
n is said
to be leaked to some user k from Xd if n 6= dk, k /∈ X
′ and
SX
′
n is decodable from the set of transmissions Xd.
The following theorem is the main result in this section
which gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for the
leakage of a share at a user.
Theorem 1. A share SX
′
n is leaked to a user k in the
SCCkeyless scheme if and only if all the following conditions
holds.
C1 k /∈ X ′, and there exists some user x1 such that n =
dx1 6= dk .
C2 The demand profile dp(X
′) = (t).
C3 Let X1 = X
′ ∪ x1. Then the demand profile dp(X1) =
(t, 1).
C4 Let {xj : j = 2, ..., t+ 1} = X
′. Then X ′ ∪ k ⊆ Ex2 .
Proof:
If part: As X1 is a (t + 1)-sized subset of [K], the
SCCkeyless scheme has a well-defined transmission
YX1 = S
X′
dx1
+ S
X1\x2
dx2
+ ...+ S
X1\xt+1
dxt+1
. (2)
By the conditions given, we have a user k such that k /∈ X1
but k ∈ Ex2 . To show that S
X′
n is leaked to user k, it is
sufficient to prove that there is a collection of transmissions
whose sum results in a linear combination of the form
SX
′
n + S
X′1
n1 + S
X′2
n2 + . . .+ S
X′p
np , (3)
for some p ≥ 1 such that k ∈ X ′i, i = 1, .., p and n 6= dk
and k /∈ X ′ (by Definition 2). We show that such a collection
of transmissions does exist. Consider the set of transmissions
YXj , where Xj = (X1\xj) ∪ k, j = 2, ..., t + 1. We write
these transmissions explicitly as follows
YX2 = S
X2\x1
dx1
+ S
X2\k
dk
+ S
X2\x3
dx3
+ ...+ S
X2\xt+1
dxt+1
YX3 = S
X3\x1
dx1
+ S
X3\x2
dx2
+ S
X3\k
dk
+ ...+ S
X3\xt+1
dxt+1
... =
...
YXt+1 = S
Xt+1\x1
dx1
+ S
Xt+1\x2
dx2
+ ...+ S
Xt+1\xt
dxt
+ S
Xt+1\k
dk
.
We claim that the sum
∑t+1
i=1 YXi is of the form (3). To see this,
firstly we note that ∀j = 2, ..., t+1, we have Xj\k = X1\xj
and k ∈ Xj\xi, ∀i 6= j. Thus, all the shares whose index does
not contain k are eliminated in the sum
∑t+1
i=1 YXi , except for
SX
′
dx1
which is the share that is to be leaked. Furthermore there
are (t+ 1)2 − 1 shares (leaving out SX
′
dx1
) totally considering
all the transmissions YXj , j = 1, ..., t + 1. By Lemma 2, at
most t(t+1) shares are eliminated in their sum (including the
shares whose indices do not contain k). Thus, at least one share
remains whose index contains k. Hence, the sum
∑t+1
i=1 YXi
is of the form (3) with p ≥ 1. This proves the if part.
Only if part: With respect to Condition C1, note that if
k ∈ X ′ then the share is already present in the cache of k.
Also, if there is no user x1 such that n = dx1 , then the share
SX
′
n will not occur in any of the transmissions of SCCkeyless
scheme and there will thus be no possibility of its leakage.
Finally if n = dk, then leakage would be a misnomer as Wn
is intended for k. Hence Condition C1 holds.
We give the rest of the proof in three stages.
Stage 1: Condition C1 holds, but Condition C2 doesn’t hold:
Suppose there is a user k at which SXn is leaked. Then we
must have dk 6= n and k /∈ X
′ (by Definition 2). Thus k /∈ X1.
We now prove by contradiction. For leakage, there should
be some linear combination of the transmissions such that (3)
is satisfied. Since no direct transmission is of the form in (3)
(as k /∈ X1 and n 6= dk), at least two transmissions have to
be linearly combined to get (3). Let a set of transmissions
linearly combined to get (3) be denoted as C.
As Condition C1 holds, the transmission YX1 is well defined
as in (2). We assume WLOG that the transmission YX1 is such
that in the linear combination of the transmissions in C leading
to (3), the share SX
′
n is not eliminated, but retained and thus
leaked (clearly, such a transmission YX1 must exist in C).
Since Condition C2 doesn’t hold, we have dp(X
′) 6= (t),
there must be some y1 ∈ X
′ such that y1 /∈ Ek. Let X =
X1\{x1, y1}. Then YX1 can be written as
YX1 = S
y1∪X
dx1
+ Sx1∪Xdy1
+
∑
x∈X
S
X1\x
dx
. (4)
Note that, when YX1 linearly combines with other transmis-
sions in C to give (3), except for Sy1∪Xdx1
, the other shares in
(4) are necessarily eliminated because k /∈ x1 ∪ X and also
k /∈ X1\x for any x ∈ X .
For the purposes of this proof, we henceforth denote a
share Sx∪X
′′
dy
as (dy, x,X
′′). In order to eliminate the share
(dy1 , x1, X) in YX1 , we need a transmission YX2 ∈ C, with
X2 = X ∪{x1, y2} with dy2 = dy1 . Obviously, we must have
y2 6= y1 as otherwise X1 = X2.
In YX1 + YX2 , the share (dy1 , x1, X) = (dy2 , x1, X) gets
eliminated, and no other share is eliminated as only at most
one share is common between any two transmissions by
Lemma 2. Thus, we now have at least one share (dx1 , y2, X)
that has to be eliminated from (YX1 + YX2 ) for leakage to
occur at user k (since k /∈ (y2 ∪X) as k /∈ Ey2 = Ey1 ). For
the sake of this proof, we call the share (dx1 , y2, X) the paired
share of the eliminated share (dy2 , x1, X) in YX2 . In order to
eliminate this paired share (dx1 , y2, X), we must have another
transmission YX3 ∈ C such that X3 = X ∪ {x2, y2} with
dx2 6= dx1 but x2 6= x1. Clearly, the sets X1, X2, and X3 are
all distinct, and hence so are the transmissions YXi , i = 1, 2, 3.
Note that the paired share of (dx2 , y2, X) is (dy2 , x2, X),
and this has to be eliminated again. We continue the process
of picking transmissions from C such that the paired share
at every step is eliminated (the stopping criterion being that
the paired share is eliminated by a prior picked transmission,
thus not requiring us to pick a new transmission from C).
Because the number of transmissions is finite, the set C′ ⊆ C
of transmissions including YX1 picked to eliminate the paired
shares is finite.
Let the last-picked transmission Y in C′ be YX∪{xr,yr′}
for some r, r′. Let the last but one transmission be Y ′. Let
(dxr , yr′ , X) be the share eliminated in Y by adding with
the previous transmission Y ′, and thus (dyr′ , xr , X) is its
paired share (the other possibility is that the (dyr′ , xr, X) is
the eliminated share in Y + Y ′, for which the proof proceeds
similarly with only minor changes).
We claim that the paired share (dyr′ , xr, X) cannot be
eliminated, thus contradicting the assumption that Y is the
last-picked transmission. The proof is as follows. Note that
any transmission of C′ prior to Y is of the form Y{xi,yj}∪X
for some xi, yj . If (dyr′ , xr , X) is to cancel with any share in
some such prior transmission Y{xi,yj}∪X of C
′ (which should
have been picked prior to Y ′ by Lemma 2), then it must be that
(dyr′ , xr, X) = (dyj , xi, X) or (dyr′ , xr , X) = (dxi , yj, X).
No other share of Y{xi,yj}∪X can be equal to (dyr′ , xr, X).
Suppose Y{xi,yj}∪X 6= YX1 and is picked prior to Y
′. Then
the shares (dxi , yj , X) and (dyj , xi, X) are eliminated already
by adding with the two transmissions picked just prior to
and just after Y{xi,yj}∪X . Furthermore, if Y{xi,yj}∪X = YX1 ,
(dxi , yj , X) must not be eliminated (it is precisely the share
which is leaked) while (dyj , xi, X) is eliminated with YX2 .
Thus no share is available in all transmissions prior to Y ′ to
eliminate (dyr′ , xr , X), as all such shares are either eliminated
already or must be preserved. This proves that C′ cannot be
finite. This proves that Condition C2 should be satisfied for
leakage.
Stage 2: Conditions C1,C2 hold, but not Condition C3
Suppose SX
′
n is leaked to a user k from YX1 . We are given
that dp(X1) 6= (t, 1) while dp(X
′) = (t). Thus, we must
have dp(X1) = (t + 1), as this is the only other possibility.
However since n 6= dk, we thus have {x1, y1} ∈ X1 such
that dx1 = dy1 6= dk. The rest of the arguments for this stage
follow that of Stage 1 (starting from the para with (4)). This
proves that Condition C3 should also hold.
Stage 3: Conditions C1, C2, C3 hold, but not Condition C4
Note that X ′ ⊆ Ex2 (by definition) and k /∈ X
′ (by
Condition 1), thus the failure of Condition C4 means that
k /∈ Ex2 .
Now consider YX1 = YX′∪x1 as in (3) from which S
X′
dx1
=
SX
′
n is supposedly leaked to user k with dx1 6= dk. As k /∈
Ex2 , there is at least one y1 ∈ X
′ such that y1 6= x1 and
dy1 6= dk . Once again, we invoke the same arguments as Stage
1 (starting from the para with (4)) to complete the proof of
this stage, showing that Condition 4 and hence the theorem
should hold true.
Using Theorem 1, we now determine the set of all possible
leaked shares in the SCCkeyless scheme.
Lemma 3. Consider the transmissions of the SCCkeyless
scheme for a particular choice of demands at the users. The
number of shares of some demanded file Wn leaked to some
user k (n 6= dk) is precisely
(
|Ek|−1
t
)
. Thus the user k can
decode
(
|Ek|−1
t
)
(Ne(d)− 1) shares of the files not demanded
by it.
Proof: There is nothing to prove if |Ek| ≤ t or ifNe(d) =
1. So we assume that |Ek| ≥ t + 1 and Ne(d) ≥ 2. Let x1
be some user such that dk 6= dx1 . Consider a subset X
′ =
{x2, .., xt+1} of Ek such that k /∈ X
′. Let X1 = X
′∪x1. The
transmission YX1 is well defined and contains the share S
X′
dx1
as a summand. Notice that all the four conditions of Theorem
1 are satisfied in this case. Thus SX
′
dx1
is leaked at user k.
Note that we can pick set X ′ ⊂ Ek (not containing k)
in
(
|Ek|−1
t
)
ways. Each such X ′ is unique, and thus so is
the leaked share SX
′
dx1
. Since there are Ne(d) − 1 ways to
choose x1 (any user whose demand is not dk can be chosen),
we thus have the total number of leaked shares at k as(
|Ek|−1
t
)
(Ne(d)− 1).
Finally, to show that no other share is leaked to k, we first
note by the conditions of Theorem 1 that any leaked share
must be of the form SX
′
n where X
′ ∪ k ∈ Ek and n /∈ Ek .
Since we have already considered all such situations in the
proof, no further leakage of shares is possible. This concludes
the proof.
IV. AN IMPROVED SECRETIVE CODED CACHING SCHEME
We now describe our improved secretive coded caching
scheme, which we denote by SCCcommon. The parameters
N,K and t (and hence M ) are as in Section II. For a given
vector of users demands d, we have, as before, a set U of
leaders consisting of Ne(d) users with all the unique demands.
The cache placement phase remains the same as SCCkeys.
After employing a (
(
K−1
t−1
)
,
(
K
t
)
) secret sharing scheme to
convert the files into shares as in SCCkeys (with each share
being of size Fs =
F
(Kt )−(
K−1
t−1 )
), the transmissions in the
delivery phase are as follows.
• For each A ⊆ [K] of size (t+1) such that demand profile
dp(A) = (t, 1), transmit Y
keys
A = TA +
∑
x∈A S
A\x
dx
,
where TA is a independently generated key of size Fs
bits.
• For each A ⊆ [K] of size (t+ 1) such that A ∩ U 6= φ
and dp(A) 6= (t, 1), transmit YA =
∑
x∈A S
A\x
dx
.
Before proving that the SCCcommon scheme is secretive
and showing the improved average rate of the scheme, we
first obtain the number of transmissions in the scheme. Note
that in the scheme, transmissions are made corresponding to
each (t+1)-sized subset A of [K], except for those subsets of
non-leaders (i.e A ⊆ [K]\U ) with dp(A) 6= (t, 1). By abuse
of terminology, we think of these sets of non-leaders with
dp(A) 6= (t, 1) as corresponding to saved transmissions, since
corresponding to these sets also, transmissions are made in the
SCCkeys scheme. These saved transmissions translate to the
reduced average rate of our scheme compared to SCCkeys.
In order to calculate the number of saved transmissions, we
partition the set of non-leaders [K]\U into demand classes
E′i : i = 1, .., b, such that the demands of users in each class is
the same. We now have the following result on the number of
saved transmissions. For the proof, we only have to count the
number (t+1)-sized subsets A ⊆ [K]\U with dp(A) = (t, 1).
Lemma 4. The number of saved transmissions in the
SCCcommon scheme is
(
K−Ne(d)
t+1
)
− ∆t, where ∆t is as
follows
• ∆t =
(
b∑
i=1
(
|E′i|
t
)
(K −Ne(d)− |E
′
i|)
)
, if t ≥ 2.
• If t = 1, then ∆t =
( ∑
{i,j}∈D
|E′i||E
′
j |
)
, where D is the
set of
(
b
2
)
(unordered) pairs of elements from [b].
Proof: Suppose t ≥ 2. Then to construct a subset A as per
our requirement, choosing t users from E′i for any i and the
remaining one user from any of the other (K−Ne(d)−|E
′
i|)
users, gives our result.
If t = 1, then one user is chosen from any E′i (for some i)
and the other from E′j (for some i 6= j) to obtain A as per our
need. A standard counting argument for the number of ways
completes the proof.
We now give our main theorem which establishes the rate of
our scheme and shows that it enables secrecy (using Theorem
1) as well as correct decoding (using Lemma 1).
Theorem 2. The SCCcommon scheme is a secretive coded
caching scheme and it achieves an average rate
Rcommonavg = Ed
(
(
(
K
t+1
)
−
(
K−Ne(d)
t+1
)
+∆t)Fs
F
)
,
for t = 1, ...,K − 2.
Proof: Firstly, we see that for successful decoding it is
sufficient for the users to obtain transmissions either Y keysA or
YA for each (t+1)-sized subset A of [K]. Now the only (t+
1)-sized subsets for which neither YA nor Y
keys
A is available
directly from the transmissions are those with dp(A) 6= (t, 1)
and A ∩ U = φ. However, by Lemma 1, any such YA is
recoverable from transmissions YAi (which are included in
SCCcommon) such that Ai ∩ U 6= φ, d(Ai) = d(A), and
Ai\A ⊆ U . This is because such YAis are transmitted in the
SCCcommon scheme without having keys as summands. Thus,
the decoding is successful at all users. Note that by Theorem
1, for any transmission A of SCCkeyless containing a leaked
share, dp(A) = (t, 1). In SCCcommon, any such transmission
has an independently generated key as a summand, restricting
the decoding of the summand shares to only intended users in
A. This completes the proof of secrecy. The achieved average
rate is clear from Lemma 4 and the description of the scheme.
Remark 1. The SCCkeys scheme proposed by [7] has an av-
erage rate
( Kt+1)Fs
F (the result in (1) is obtained by simplifying
this expression). Our scheme has a better average rate than
SCCkeys as ∆t ≤
(
K−Ne(d)
t+1
)
.
Example 2. Let N = 10 and K = 10 and t = 2. Let the
vector d = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3).
Let us consider the set of leaders as U = {1, 6, 10} and
so Ne(d) = 3. The sets of users with same demands are
E1 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, E2 = {6, 7, 8, 9}, E3 = {10}. There will
be
(
K
t+1
)
= 120 transmissions in the SCCkeys scheme, and all
the transmissions are with keys. Now, to calculate the number
of transmissions in SCCcommon scheme, we partition the non-
leader set {2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9} into the demand classes E′i, i =
1, 2, 3 with users with the same demand in each class, and ob-
tain E′1 = {2, 3, 4, 5}, E
′
2 = {7, 8, 9}, E
′
3 = φ. Using Lemma
4, we obtain ∆t =
((
4
2
)
(10− 3− 4) +
(
3
2
)
(10− 3− 3)
)
=
30, while
(
K−Ne(d)
t+1
)
= 35. Thus the number of saved
transmissions compared to the SCCkeys scheme is 5, and
the SCCcommon scheme requires 115 transmissions. The
transmissions of SCCcommon with keys correspond to all
the subsets of [K] of size (t + 1) = 3 with demand profile
(t, 1) = (2, 1). It is a simple counting argument to show
that this is equal to
(
5
2
)
(5) +
(
4
2
)
(6) = 86. The remaining
29 transmissions are sent without keys. The rate Rcommon
corresponding to this choice of demands in the SCCcommon
scheme is easily seen to be approximately 0.96Rkeysavg .
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